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Abstract 
_______________________________________________________ 
This study actually draws from and builds on an earlier paper (Kumar and 
Bhattacharya, 2002). Here we have basically added a neutrosophic dimension to 
the problem of determining the conditional probability that a financial fraud has 
been actually committed, given that no Type I error occurred while rejecting the 
null hypothesis H0: The observed first-digit frequencies approximate a Benford 
distribution; and accepting the alternative hypothesis H1: The observed first-digit 
frequencies do not approximate a Benford distribution. We have also suggested 
a conceptual model to implement such a neutrosophic fraud detection system. 
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Re-visiting the problem of testing for manipulation in accounting data 
 
In an earlier paper (Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2002), we had proposed a Monte 
Carlo adaptation of Benford’s law. There has been some research already on the 
application of Benford’s law to financial fraud detection (Carslaw, 1988 and Busta 
and Weinberg 1998). However, most of the practical work in this regard has been 
concentrated in detecting the first digit frequencies from the account balances 
selected on basis of some known audit sampling method and then directly 
comparing the result with the expected Benford frequencies (Raimi, 1976 and 
Hill, 1998). We have voiced our reservations about this technique in so far as that 
the Benford frequencies are necessarily steady state frequencies and may not 
therefore be truly reflected in the sample frequencies. As samples are always of 
finite sizes, it is therefore perhaps not entirely fair to arrive at any conclusion on 
the basis of such a direct comparison, as the sample frequencies won’t be steady 
state frequencies.     
            
However, if we draw digits randomly using the inverse transformation technique 
from within random number ranges derived from a cumulative probability 
distribution function based on the Benford frequencies then the problem boils 
down to running a goodness of fit kind of test to identify any significant difference 
between observed and simulated first-digit frequencies. This test may be 
conducted using a known sampling distribution like for example the Pearson’s χ² 
distribution. The random number ranges for the Monte Carlo simulation are to be 
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drawn from a cumulative probability distribution function based on the following 
Benford probabilities given in Table I. 
   
Table I 
First Significant Digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Benford Probability 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
 
The first-digit probabilities can be best approximated mathematically by the log-
based formula Benford derived: P (First significant digit = d) = log10 [1 + (1/d)] 
(Benford, 1938). 
 
Computational Algorithm:        
         
1. Define a finite sample size n and draw a sample from the relevant 
account balances using a suitable audit sampling procedure 
                                                                                                                  
2. Perform a continuous Monte Carlo run of length λ* ≈ (1/2ε)2/3 grouped in 
epochs of size n using a customized MS-Excel spreadsheet. Derivation 
of λ* and other statistical issues have been discussed in detail in our 
earlier paper (Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2002) 
 
3. Test for significant difference in sample frequencies between the first 
digits observed in the sample and those generated by the Monte Carlo 
 4
simulation by using a “goodness of fit” test using the χ² distribution. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
 
           H0: The observed first digit frequencies approximate a Benford distribution 
            H1: The observed first digit frequencies do not approximate a Benford distribution              
 
This statistical test will not reveal whether or not a fraud has actually been 
committed. All it does is establishing at a desired level of confidence, that the 
accounting data has been manipulated (if H0 is rejected).   
 
However, given that H1 is accepted and H0 is rejected, it could imply any of the 
following events: 
 
I. There is no manipulation - Type I error has occurred i.e. H0 rejected when true.     
II. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely fraudulent. 
III. There is manipulation and such manipulation may or may not be fraudulent. 
IV. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely not fraudulent. 
 
Neutrosophic extension 
 
Neutrosophic probabilities are a generalization of classical and fuzzy probabilities and 
cover those events that involve some degree of indeterminacy. It provides a better 
approach to quantifying uncertainty than classical or even fuzzy probability theory. 
Neutrosophic probability theory uses a subset-approximation for truth-value as well as 
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indeterminacy and falsity values. Also, this approach makes a distinction between 
“relative true event” and “absolute true event” the former being true in only some 
probability sub-spaces while the latter being true in all probability sub-spaces. Similarly, 
events that are false in only some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative false 
events” while events that are false in all probability sub-spaces are classified as 
“absolute false events”. Again, the events that may be hard to classify as either ‘true’ or 
‘false’ in some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative indeterminate events” 
while events that bear this characteristic over all probability sub-spaces are classified as 
“absolute indeterminate events”.  (Smarandache, 2001) 
 
While in classical probability n_sup ≤ 1, in neutrosophic probability n_sup ≤ 3+ where 
n_sup is the upper bound of the probability space. In cases where the truth and falsity 
components are complimentary, i.e. there is no indeterminacy, the components sum to 
unity and neutrosophic probability is reduced to classical probability as in the tossing of a 
fair coin or the drawing of a card from a well-shuffled deck. 
 
Coming back to our original problem of financial fraud detection, let E be the event 
whereby a Type I error has occurred and F be the event whereby a fraud is actually 
detected. Then the conditional neutrosophic probability NP (F | Ec) is defined over a 
probability space consisting of a triple of sets (T, I, U). Here, T, I and U are probability 
sub-spaces wherein event F is t% true, i% indeterminate and u% untrue respectively, 
given that no Type I error occurred. 
 
The sub-space T within which t varies may be determined by factors such as past 
records of fraud in the organization, propensity to commit fraud by the employees 
concerned, and effectiveness of internal control systems. On the other hand, the sub-
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space U within which u varies may be determined by factors like personal track records 
of the employees in question, the position enjoyed and the remuneration drawn by those 
employees. For example, if the magnitude of the embezzled amount is deemed too 
frivolous with respect to the position and remuneration of the employees involved. The 
sub-space I within which i varies is most likely to be determined by the mutual 
inconsistency in the circumstantial evidence (Zadeh, 1976) that might arise out of the 
effects of some of the factors determining T and U.  For example, if an employee is for 
some reason really irked with the organization, then he or she may be inclined to commit 
fraud not so much to further his or her own interests as to harm the interests of the 
organization, although the act of actually committing the suspected fraud may in this 
case overtly appear inconsistent with the organizational status and remuneration 
enjoyed by that person. 
   
A conceptual model to implement the neutrosophic fraud detection system  
 
Modern technology has armed the investigative accountants with tools and 
techniques not only to track down the perpetrators of fraud more efficiently than was 
possible in the absence of those technologies but also to carry out a multi-faceted 
analytical inquiry into the nature of financial frauds and their perpetrators. 
 
We propose classifying financial frauds in the modern corporate scenario using a 
systematic, multi-level categorization. The simplest one would of course be a two-
level classification where one classifier is in terms of the nature of fraudulent 
manipulation and the other is in terms of involvement of the perpetrators e.g. fraud 
by an individual, a group of isolated individuals or a collusive fraud. A sub-
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classification within this second categorization could be based on whether the group 
(isolated or collusive) consists of hierarchical positions or horizontal positions in the 
organizational structure. Then what may come up with is the following two-
dimensional manipulation-involvement or MI-matrix: 
 
The row and column elements in this simple MI-matrix may be denoted as follows: 
αij: 
i = 8: Single fraud perpetrated by single individual 
i = 7: Multiple frauds perpetrated by single individual 
i = 6: Single fraud perpetrated by group of isolated individuals 
i = 5: Multiple frauds perpetrated by group of isolated individuals 
i = 4: Single fraud perpetrated by a horizontally collusive group 
i = 3: Multiple frauds perpetrated by a horizontally collusive group 
i = 2: Single fraud perpetrated by a vertically collusive group 
i = 1: Multiple frauds perpetrated by a vertically collusive group 
j = 5: Combination of 1, 2, 3 and 4 
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j = 4: Suppression or destruction of key transaction records 
j = 3: Misrepresentation of the fundamental nature of transaction 
j = 2: Falsification of transaction date/amount/particulars (double-entry basis) 
j = 1: Falsification of transaction date/amount/particulars (single-entry basis) 
 
Once a particular case has been objectively classified on the MI-matrix, the investigative 
accountant may start looking for incriminating evidence in the financial records from the 
right perspective. For example, the search perspective will definitely differ if there is 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a transaction as compared to a simple erring 
journal entry. The perspective will also differ if only a single individual is involved rather 
than a collusive group.  
 
The two-dimensional MI-matrix is the simplest form of systematic multi-level 
classification which certainly may be conceptually expanded to include more than two 
levels – e.g. a three-dimensional MI-matrix could possibly incorporate the aspect of fraud 
potentiality in terms of factors like personal track records of the employees in question, 
the position enjoyed by them in the organization, their remuneration and entitlements at 
the time of the fraud etc. It would therefore be an ideal computational set-up for 
implementation of a neutrosophic system. The conceptual fraud classification scheme 
we proposed here may thus be effectively combined with the rules of neutrosophic 
probability into developing a handy forensic accounting expert system for the future! 
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Conclusion  
 
No doubt then that the theory of neutrosophic probability opens up a new vista of 
analytical reasoning for the techno-savvy forensic accountant. In this paper, we have 
only posit that a combination of statistical testing of audit samples based on Benford’s 
law together with a neutrosophic reasoning could help the forensic accountant in getting 
a better fix on the quantitative possibility of actually detecting a financial fraud. This is an 
emerging science and thus holds a vast potential of future research endeavours the 
ultimate objective of which will be to actually come up with a reliable, comprehensive 
computational methodology to actually track down financial frauds with a very low failure 
rate. We believe our present work is just an initial step towards that ultimate destination. 
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